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This Comment explores the troubling phenomenon of "lettermarking,"
which occurs when Members of Congress write to personnel in administrative
agencies to request appropriations that would benefit their donors and
constituents. Although lettermarking has exploded in popularity since both
houses of Congress adopted a moratorium on earmarking in 2011, nothing has
been written about this practice in legal scholarship.
This Comment fills that gap by providing a descriptive account of
lettermarking and by suggesting ways to curb this pernicious practice. Part I
documents the rise of lettermarking and explains how lettermarks damage
American democracy. Part I also discusses Executive Order 13,457,
promulgated by President George W. Bush in an attempt to control
lettermarking. We explain why EO 13,457 has not been enforced and suggest
that some supplementary control mechanism-preferably one that relies on
private actors-will be needed to curb lettermarks.
Part II suggests that unsuccessful grant applicants may be able to fill this
role by suing agencies that considered lettermarks when deciding which
projects to fund. Indeed, since lettermarks induce agencies to act on the basis
of extraneous political pressure, they violate several legal rules that require
agencies to make decisions through merits-based processes.
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Introduction
Under pressure from Tea Party groups frustrated with the largesse of gov-
ernment spending, Congress banned earmarking in early 2011.1 But this wasn't
the end of handouts. Stripped of their power to directly insert earmarks into leg-
islation, lawmakers quietly began asking agency personnel for appropriations
that would benefit their donors and constituents. These requests-called
"lettermarks"-have been described as "cattle prods to agency heads,"2 forcing
them to fund Members' pet projects or else incur their ire.3
Lettermarks come in all shapes and sizes. Some have served the personal
interests of politicians, as when then-Senator Mark Pryor wrote to the Depart-
ment of Transportation to request $12 million for a bike path outside his Senate
office in Little Rock.4 Others are indicative of quid pro quo dealings between
politicians and their donors. Representative Brad Ellsworth, for example, wrote
to the Department of Energy encouraging the Secretary to award grant funds to
the Duke Energy Company; only months before, Ellsworth had collected thou-
sands of dollars in campaign donations from that company's political action
committee.5 Most lettermarks, however, are motivated by Members' persistent
desire to bring home the bacon. The problem with this type of lettermarking is
that it sometimes results in the funding of undeserving projects. Moreover,
since lettermarks are not public, Members can pressure agencies without fear
that their behavior will later be discovered. Unsurprisingly, the gulf between
politicians' public positions and private communications is often considerable.
For example, recent investigative reporting has exposed the hypocrisy of doz-
ens of Members who wrote to federal agencies to request stimulus funding for
pet projects after having vocally opposed the passage of the stimulus.6 In an
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1. Erik Wasson, Watchdogs Fear Rise of Backdoor Earmarking in the Next Congress,
THE HILL (Dec. 28, 2010), http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/appropriations/135291 -spending-
watchdogs-home-in-on-lettermarking-as-threat-next-year; see Scott Wong, Senate Dems Give In on
Earmark Ban, POLITICO (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0211/48623.html.
2. Maryls Harris, Are 'Lettermarks' Congress' New End-Around on the Earmarks
Ban?, MINN. POST (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2013/09/are-lettermarks-
congress-new-end-around-earmarks-ban.
3. See TOM A. COBURN, THE DEBT BOMB 48 (2012) (noting that Members often "call[]
agency heads to cajole them to fund certain grants or risk budget cuts to their agenc[ies]").
4. Thomas Jones, Senator Pryor Seeks $12 Million Secret Lettermark for Bike Path,
339 GROUP LLC, http://3 3 9groupllc.com/blog/2013/8/30/senator-pryor-seeks-12-million-secret-
lettermark-for-bike-path (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
5. John Solomon & Aaron Mehta, Stimulating Hypocrisy: Scores of Recovery Act Op-
ponents Sought Money out of Public View, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Oct. 19, 2010),
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2010/10/19/2 4 2 1/stimulating-hypocrisy-scores-recovery-act-opponents-
sought-money-out-public-view.
6. Id. Representative Michele Bachmann-who brags about voting against "the failed




even more stunning display of hypocrisy, Representative Jeff Flake went on
record as opposing earmarks; several months later, his rampant lettermarking
was exposed by documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act.7
Lettermarking has exploded in popularity since the adoption of the ear-
mark moratorium.8 In 2011 alone, the Department of Transportation received
over one thousand lettermarks.9 "Phonemarking," which occurs when Members
call agencies to request appropriations,'0 has also become common. While it's
impossible to know exactly how many lettermarks and phonemarks have been
made in the last four years, the figure likely numbers in the tens of thousands.
Despite the prominence of lettermarking, nothing has been written about
this practice in legal scholarship. Although lettermarking has received some at-
tention in the press and in political science articles, a Westlaw search for "let-
termark" returns no results from either case law or secondary legal literature.
This Comment fills that gap by providing a descriptive account of letter-
marking and by suggesting ways to curb this pernicious practice. Part I docu-
ments the rise of lettermarking and explains how lettermarks damage American
democracy. Part I also discusses Executive Order 13,457, promulgated by Pres-
ident George W. Bush in an attempt to control lettermarking. Alas, EO 13,457
has not been enforced against executive agencies. Since it is unlikely that any
Executive Order would ever be meticulously enforced, some supplementary
control mechanism-preferably one that relies on private actors-will be need-
ed to curb lettermarks. Part II suggests that unsuccessful grant applicants may
be able to fill this role by suing agencies that considered lettermarks when de-
ciding which projects to fund. Indeed, since lettermarks induce agencies to act
on the basis of extraneous political pressure, they cannot be squared with legal
rules that require agencies to make decisions through merits-based processes.
see also Suzy Khimm, The Danger ofDriving Earmarks Underground, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 28, 2010),
http://www.mothejones.com/mojo/2010/12/danger-driving-earmarks-underground.
7. John Celock, JeffFlake, Arizona Senate Candidate, Wrote Federal Agencies About
Local Projects, HUFFINGTON POsT (June 27, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/27/jeff
-flake-arizona-senate-earmarks n 1631682.html.
8. See Kevin Bogardus, Obama Administration Draft Memo Could Shed Light on 'Let-
termarking,' THE HILL (Nov. 9, 2011), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/l92497-obama-
administration-draft-memo-could-shed-light-on-lettermarking; Wasson, supra note 1; see also John Sol-
omon & Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, In the Democratic Congress, Pork Still Gets Served, WASH. POST (May
24, 2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/23/AR2007052301782.html.
9. James R. Carroll, Critics: Congressional Spending Requests Less Open, USA TODAY
(Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/04/01/congressional-letter-mark-
spending-requests/2044095/.
10. ROGER H. DAVIDSON, WALTER J. OLESZEK & FRANCES E. LEE, CONGRESS AND ITS
MEMBERS 407 (14th ed. 2014); see Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules and
Statutory Interpretation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 519, 550 n. 157 (2009).
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I. A Brief Primer on Lettermarks
By 2010, frustration with earmarks had reached a fever pitch. After secur-
ing control of the House by promising to reign in government spending, House
Republicans voted to ban earmarks altogether. The Democratic-controlled Sen-
ate soon followed suit. Once they realized that they could no longer insert ear-
marks directly into legislation, many Members turned to the lettermark process.
Indeed, congressional insiders agree that lettermarking has become substantial-
ly "more prevalent because of the earmark ban."' When asked in 2011 whether
the earmark ban had curtailed the power of the Appropriations Committee's
Members to direct funds to their favored projects, Congressman Jim Moran
scoffed. "[T]he appropriators are going to be okay," he said. "[W]e know peo-
ple in agencies."12
The rise of lettermarking presents a number of troubling problems. First
and most importantly, lettermarks curb agency independence. Much ink has
been spilled extolling the virtue of independent agency decision-making,'3 and
those arguments need not be rehashed here. Put simply, agencies cannot bring
to bear their substantial experience and expertise if their personnel are award-
ing funding in response to political pressure rather than merits-based criteria.
Second, a lettermark-unlike an earmark-is nearly impossible to track.14
Thus, lettermarking allows for quid pro quo dealings between politicians and
their donors. These types of transactions are well-documented in both the polit-
ical science literature on earmarking5 and in anecdotal reports in the popular
press.16 Indeed, Senator Tom Coburn has noted that the reason that Members
use lettermarks is precisely because this strategy "avoid[s] a paper trail and
transparency rules"'7 and therefore allows them to cultivate "the culture of pa-
rochialism and careerism" without any consequences.'8
11. Bogardus, supra note 8.
12. Daniel Strauss, House Appropriator: We Know How to Get Around Earmark Ban,
THE HILL (Mar. 3, 2011, 7:31 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/147347-house-
appropriator-we-know-how-to-get-around-earmark-ban.
13. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2245,
2352-58 (2001); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 106-20 (1994); Peter L. Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in Government: Separation
ofPowers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 578-87 (1984).
14. Under current law, citizens cannot FOIA records of Members' communication with
agencies from Members' offices. They must instead FOIA these records directly from the agencies,
which is often prohibitively inconvenient or time consuming. When agencies do respond to requests for
the lettermarks, they are often heavily redacted. See Carroll, supra note 9.
15. See, e.g., Kenneth N. Bickers & Robert M. Stein, The Electoral Dynamics of the
Federal Pork Barrel, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1300 (1996); Matz Dahlberg & Eva Johansson, On the Vote-
Purchasing Behavior ofIncumbent Governments, 96 AM. J. POL. Sci. 27 (2002).
16. See Solomon & Mehta, supra note 5; see also Michael Luo & Mike McIntire, Do-
nors Gave as Santorum Won Earmarks, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01
/1 6/us/politics/as-rick-santorum-secured-earmarks-2006-donations-flowed-in.html.





As reformers have long recognized, forcing the disclosure of lettermarks
would disincentivize these quid pro quo transactions. Instead of spending time
on the hopeless task of limiting the money that flows from donors to politi-
cians," the more sensible strategy is to limit the pork that flows from politi-
cians to donors. Disclosure of lettermarks would stop the flow of pork by nam-
ing and shaming politicians who engage in quid pro quo dealings with donors.
In the last year of his presidency, George W. Bush recognized that letter-
marking had gotten out of hand. His response was Executive Order 13,457,
which attempted to promote the disclosure of lettermarks by mandating that
"no oral or written communications concerning earmarks shall supersede statu-
tory criteria, competitive awards, or merit-based decision-making."20 EO
13,457 also mandated that "[a]ll written communications from the Congress ...
recommending that funds be committed, obligated, or expended on any ear-
mark shall be made publicly available on the Internet by the receiving agency"
within thirty days of their receipt.21 And, to cut down on phonemarking, EO
13,457 also called for agencies to ignore all congressional requests for funding
unless they were made in writing.22
Unfortunately, EO 13,457 has been all but ignored by agencies. Although
it remains on the books, observers who study lettermarks have concluded that
agencies seldom post lettermarks online.23 The impotence of EO 13,457 is not
surprising. When agency personnel receive a phone call from the Member who
controls their budget, they cannot reasonably be expected to rebuff a funding
request on the basis of an executive order that is purely aspirational. If an exec-
utive order is not a priority of the President, it will not be a priority of the agen-
cy.
For a brief moment in early 2011, it appeared that President Obama had
made ending lettermarking a priority. In February of that year, the Obama Ad-
ministration circulated a draft executive order that was designed to "implement
EO 13,457 and to build upon that Order by providing additional transparency
and promoting greater efficiency in the allocation of federal monies."24 This
draft would have forced all executive agencies to "make available to the pub-
lic in searchable form on the Internet [within thirty days] all written communi-
cations from any Member of Congress" that "request[] that agencies give spe-
cial consideration to any specific person, organization, or other entity or group
19. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Re-
form, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1713 (1999).
20. Exec. Order No. 13,457, 73 Fed. Reg. 6417 (Feb. 1, 2008).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. John Wonderlich, Where Is Obama on Bush's Earmark Transparency Executive
Order, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Mar. 17, 2011, 9:47 AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2011
/03/07/where-is-obama-on-bushs-earmark-transparency-executive-order/.
24. Text of Draft Executive Memo, NAT'L J. (Nov. 5, 2011), http://
www.nationaljournal.com/whitehouse/text-of-draft-executive-memo-20111105.
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of entities" when making appropriations decisions.25 This proposed reform
made good sense, and it might have gone a long way toward closing some of
the loopholes created by the flexible and ambiguous text of EO 13,457.26 Alas,
under pressure from special interests, this draft proposal was quietly with-
drawn.27
II. A Novel Solution to the Lettermarking Problem
Unfortunately, executive orders simply are not a workable means of curb-
ing lettennarks. EO 13,457 has been flatly ignored by executive agencies. Even
if EO 13,457 were replaced by a carefully drafted executive order, it probably
would not be enforced by every agency or in every instance of a violation. In
order to stamp out the lettermarking problem, private litigants must begin suing
agencies that consider lettermarks when making decisions.28
Such a litigant could pursue multiple legal theories. Indeed, although EO
13,457 demonstrates an admirable political commitment to ending lettermark-
ing, executive proposals to curb this practice are, legally speaking, superfluous.
EO 13,457, for example, directed agencies to ignore lettermarks and engage on-
ly in "merit-based decision making" when deciding which projects to fund.29
But this was already a legal requirement well before the order was promulgat-
ed. There are already several legal rules-any of which could provide the basis
for judicial review3 -- that require agencies to use only merits-based processes.
25. Id.
26. If the Obama administration wants to get serious about lettermarking, it must make
several changes to the text of its 2011 proposal. Several of these alterations are nothing more than low-
hanging fruit. First, by its own terms, the draft applied only to written communications. In order to help
reign in phonemarks, an improved executive order might require agencies to begin keeping (and disclos-
ing) substantive records of calls from Members or their staffs that relate to the funding of any project.
Second, a more carefully worded executive order would mandate disclosure of all communications in
which any specific project is mentioned by a Member. After EO 13,457 was implemented, at least one
Member argued that his lettermarks were not "requests" for funding, but rather a neutral and good-faith
attempt to inform the agency of opportunities to fund worthy projects. Carroll, supra note 9. If Obama's
draft executive order were implemented, many Members might parse its language, arguing that letter-
marks are merely informational documents and are not intended to pressure agencies. Third, the execu-
tive order could explicitly call for limitations on redactions so that as much of the letters as possible
could be made public.
27. COBURN, supra note 3, at 48.
28. One potential problem with this solution is that potential litigants will not know
when agencies have considered a lettermark and, therefore, will not know whether or not they could sue
the agency. Ideally, EO 13,457 or a similar executive order would be aggressively enforced, leading to
the disclosure of lettermarks. Litigants could then sue on the basis of these disclosed documents. We
emphasize, however, that disclosure of lettermarks through an executive order is not a prerequisite to
litigation. Plenty of lettermarks have already been disclosed-some by Members, some by leaks, and
some by investigative reporting. Any of these lettermarks might provide a basis for litigation.
29. Exec. Order No. 13,457, supra note 20.
30. The APA provides for general review of nearly all agency action. 5 U.S.C. § § 702,
704 (2006); see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). But, if sued, the agen-
cy will likely point to section 701(a)(2) of the APA, which bars judicial review of decisions "committed
to agency discretion by law." In Lincoln v. Vigil, the Supreme Court held that "[t]he allocation of funds
from a lump-sum appropriation is [an] administrative decision traditionally regarded as committed to
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First, many agencies' organic statutes pecifically list the criteria that can
and cannot be considered when agency personnel make funding decisions.
These provisions provide a clear justification for courts to "inquire into the con-
tent of political reasons considered by agencies to determine whether those rea-
sons are consistent with the agency's authorizing statute."31 Second, decision-
making restraints may be imposed by the language of particular spending bills.
Third, agencies must also follow memoranda from the Office of Management
and Budget that require "merit-based decision making" and "competitive
awards."32 Fourth, agencies are bound by the Administrative Procedure Act,
which prevents them from making any decision that is "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 33
Moreover, lettermarking may constitute improper congressional interfer-
ence with agency decision-making. Under the Pillsbury doctrine, federal courts
have not hesitated to intervene in adjudications when the rights of private liti-
gants have been imperiled by undue congressional influence.34 However, courts
have been much more hesitant to interfere with non-adjudicatory agency pro-
ceedings.3 5 But even in this context, the D.C. Circuit has indicated that "Con-
gressional intervention which occurs during the still-pending decisional process
of an agency endangers, and may undermine, the integrity of the ensuing deci-
sion, which Congress has required be made by an impartial agency."36
D.C. Federation of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe is instructive. In that case, Rep-
resentative William Natcher threatened to block funds for D.C.'s rapid-transit
system unless the Secretary of Transportation approved funding for a bridge
over the Potomac. Chief Judge Bazelon of the D.C. Circuit found that this pres-
sure tainted the Secretary's decision to approve the bridge and therefore invali-
dated the agency's action. Chief Judge Bazelon's opinion emphasized that the
agency's "decision would be invalid if based in whole or in part on the pres-
sures emanating from Representative Natcher" and remanded the case to the
Secretary with instructions to "make new determinations based strictly on the
agency discretion." 508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993). Vigil, however, does not bar all judicial review of finding
decisions. Importantly, an agency's own rules are a source of law to apply under section 701 (a)(2) even
if the substantive statute provides a lump sum and no criteria for spending. See Miami Nation of Indians
of Ind. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 255 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 2001).
31. Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing "Political" Oversight ofAgency Decision Making,
108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1174 (2010); see Aera Energy LLC v. Salazar, 642 F.3d 212, 224 (D.C. Cir.
2011) ("[S]ometimes political pressure crosses the line and prevents an agency from performing its stat-
utorily prescribed duties."); CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 176-77 & n.12 (1990).
32. Memorandum to Heads of All Agencies from Rob Portman, Dir., The Office of
Mgmt. & Budget (Feb. 15, 2007), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda
/fy2007/m07-10.pdf.
33. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
34. Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952, 963 (5th Cir. 1966).
35. JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD A. MERILL & PETER M. SHANE, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM, CASES AND MATERIALS 172-75 (6th ed. 2009).
36. Am. Pub. Gas Ass'n v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 567 F.2d 1016, 1068-69 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
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merits and completely without regard to any considerations not made relevant
by Congress in the applicable statutes."37
Under D.C. Federation, courts may set aside agency actions that result
from improper congressional influence.38 Importantly, such decisions are sub-
ject to "judicial invalidation even when federal legislators push agency officials
to make policy choices that fall squarely within the agency's statutory man-
date."39 Exactly what must be shown to prove undue congressional influence is
an open question. Recent case law from the courts of appeals has sometimes
required litigants to show that agency decisionmakers acted with an "actual bi-
as" resulting from extraneous political pressure.4 0 Although the particulars of
the "actual bias" inquiry vary between different jurisdictions, this standard is
generally understood to imply that "political pressure invalidates agency action
only when it shapes, in whole or in part, the judgment of the ultimate agency
decisionmaker."4 1
Many funding decisions made in response to lettermarks could be invali-
dated under the "actual bias" standard. Assume, for example, that a civil serv-
ant at the Department of Transportation receives a letter from the Member who
chairs the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. As-
sume further that this letter requests that a competitive grant be awarded to an
applicant seeking to build a bridge in the Senator's home state. Before closing,
the letter implies that the agency will face funding reductions if it does not
comply with the Senator's request. In a follow-up phone call, a member of the
Senator's staff tells the civil servant that, unless the Senator gets his way, he
will oppose an agency initiative unrelated to the bridge project. The civil serv-
ant then decides to award the grant to the bridge project even though she admits
that she would not have done so in the absence of the letter and the phone call.
It is at least arguable that this civil servant has acted with "actual bias"
and that an unsuccessful applicant for the same grant could sue the agency to
37. D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (em-
phasis added).
38. See Ronald M. Levin, Congressional Ethics and Constituent Advocacy in an Age of
Mistrust, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1, 43-46 (1996); see also Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 409 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (holding that, before rulemakings can be set aside, challengers must show that the administrative
decisionmaker was affected by congressional pressure designed to force her to consider "factors not
made relevant by Congress in the applicable statute"); Am. Pub. Gas Ass'n, 567 F.2d at 1070 ("We con-
sider the intervention through the Subcommittee [by Congress] regrettable and quite inconsistent with
that due regard for the independence of the Commission which Congress and the courts must maintain.
Nevertheless, when weighed in the context of the record as a whole, the possibility of influence upon the
Commission is too intangible and hypothetical a basis for this court of its own motion to nullify [the
agency action].").
39. Jamelle C. Sharpe, Judging Congressional Oversight, 65 ADMIN. L. REv. 183, 209
(2013).
40. DCP Farms v. Yeutter, 957 F.2d 1183, 1188 (5th Cir. 1992); see Dirt, Inc. v. Mo-
bile Cnty. Comm'n, 739 F.2d 1562 (11 th Cir. 1984); Levin, supra note 38, at 43-46; Richard McMillan,
Jr., The Permissible Scope ofHearings, Discovery, and Additional Fact/inding During Judicial Review
ofInformalAgency Action, 1982 DUKE L.J. 333, 367-68 & n.190 (collecting cases).




have the funding decision invalidated. Admittedly, such a lawsuit would be an
uphill battle. As an initial matter, the unsuccessful grant applicant would have
to learn of the existence of the lettermark either through a FOIA request or a
leak. The applicant would then have to sue the agency in order to discover de-
tails about the process used to award the grant.42 If the case advanced to the
merits, the agency would likely argue that the lettermark had been sent for "in-
formational purposes only"43 and that such communications are a proper form
of congressional oversight. The unsuccessful grant applicant would probably
respond by citing D.C. Federation for the principle that, when a congressional
threat is the but-for cause of an agency decision, that decision must be invali-
dated. The judge, finding little precedent on point, would likely find this case to
be a difficult one.
A more promising route for unsuccessful grant applicants would be to ar-
gue for an easing of the "actual bias" standard. Although a full discussion of
this standard is beyond the scope of this Comment, many academics feel that
the "actual bias" threshold is much too high." On this view, the "actual bias"
standard protects more congressional bullying than it should. Practically speak-
ing, agency personnel have no choice but to buckle when they receive letter-
marks from Members. One former appropriations staffer has noted, "When you
have people who control your budget[] that you have to appear before on an
annual basis to ask for funding, you listen to what they have to say."45 Thus,
even if civil servants who considered lettermarks when making funding deci-
sions did not act with "actual bias," there is still reason to be skeptical of their
objectivity. The law must evolve to appreciate this reality. Such an evolution is
necessary to promote agency independence, stamp out corruption, reinforce
merits-based decisionmaking, and protect lay grant applicants who lack the
money necessary to secure special access to their Members of Congress.
Conclusion
In this Comment, we have suggested a number of legal theories that might
be used to curb the practice of lettermarking. To some extent, these theories are
mutually reinforcing. For example, litigation may succeed in sparking public
outcry even if the lawsuit itself is not successful in court. Similarly, a lawsuit
based on a leaked lettermark may generate pressure to disclose even more let-
termarks, which in turn may generate even more lawsuits.
42. The applicant might also be forced to exhaust the agency's own review processes.
43. Some Members include language in their lettermarks insisting that their communi-
cation is intended for "informational purposes only," and is not intended in any way to be a "congres-
sional directive." See Celock, supra note 7 (discussing Representative Flake's lettermarks).
44. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 38, at 51-54.
45. Ron Nixon, Lawmakers Finance Pet Projects Without Earmarks, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
27, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/28/us/politics/28earmarks.htm. (quoting Winslow
Wheeler).
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Agency personnel confronted with a congressional lettermark are placed
between a rock and a hard place-or, to borrow a phrase from Chief Judge Ba-
zelon's opinion in D.C Federation, in an "extremely treacherous position."46
Members, however, covet the lettermark and strenuously deny that it causes
any harm. Some Members have gone so far as to deny that lettermarking even
exists.47 The reality, of course, is much different. Lettermarks are alive and
well-and so too is the culture of corruption that they represent.
210
46. D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
47. See Harris, supra note 2.
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